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to travel on the public streets.8 9 Although these rights are not absolute
and are subject to reasonable parking regulations, including parking
meter zones, it has been held that to deny the right to load and
unload passengers or freight without payment of a fee would be unreasonable. 40 Consequently, parking meter ordinances are often phrased
to exclude such temporary stops, 41 and in other cases the court will
imply an exception. 42 Probably adequate loading zones would be sufficient protection against this defect.
Conclusion
The struggle over the validity of parking meters has resulted in a
substantial victory for the proponents of the ordinances. 43 Nevertheless,
municipalities are somewhat limited as to particular uses of parking
meters and their receipts. These limitations are not of a character
which will restrict the municipality to a sphere of action too small to
effectuate the regulatory purposes of the ordinances. On the other
hand, the general public is protected from municipal abuse by the
police regulation theory and its incidental restrictions. Lest it be
thought that the courts have unduly sacrificed individual rights to
pressure from municipal authorities, several courts have indicated they
would not look with favor at "unreasonable" application of parking
meter ordinances. 44 If the courts do not fulfill their obligation in this
regard it is probable that the future limitations on the use of parking
meters will be determined by the legislative process.
WmLtmx T. JACOBSON
Post Conviction Remedies in Illinois
In an effort to remove the procedural confusion in cases where persons convicted of crimes desire to question the constitutionality of their
conviction, the Illinois Legislature, at the 1949 Session, passed an act
entitled Remedy for Convicts Claiming Denial of ConstitutionalRights.'
The need for such a procedure was strikingly indicated by the United
States Supreme Court in Loftus v. Illinois2 and the concurring opinion
39 Ex parte Duncan, 179 Okla. 355, 65 P. (2d) 1015 (1937); Harper v. City of
Wichita Falls, 105 S.W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
40 In re Opinion of the Justices, 297 Mass. 559, 8 N.E. (2d) 179 (1937); Wonewoe v. Taubert, 203 Wis. 73, 233 N.W. 755 (1930).
41 Harper v. City of Wichita Falls, 105 S.W. (2d) 743 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937);
Webster County Court v. Roman, 121 W.Va. 381, 3 S.E. (2d) 631 (1939).
42 Andrews v. City of Marion, 221 Ind. 422, 47 N.E. (2d) 968 (1943); Gilsey
Building Inc. v. Village of Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 694
(1939).
43 It is significant that in De Aryan v. City of San Diego, 75 Cal. App. (2d)
292, 170 P. (2d) 482 (1946) no attack was made on the legality of the parking
meter ordinance as a regulation, the suit being brought only on a theory of misuse
of funds.
44 State v. McCarthy, 126 Fla. 433, 171 So. 314 (1936); Gilsey Building Inc. v.
Village of Great Neck Plaza, 170 Misc. 945, 954, 11 N.Y.S. (2d) 694, 703 (1939)
where the court said: "It seems unnecessary to add that if special circumstances
present themselves in the improper or unreasonable enforcement of the ordinance
in question, to the substantial injury of the plaintiff, it is not remediless."

1 The act, which was approved Aug. 4, 1949, is incorporated into the Illinois
Criminal Code, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949); see: Jenner, Ill. Post Conviction Hearing Act
9 Fed. Rules 347 (1949), c. 38, §§826-832.
2 334 U.S. 804 (1948).
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of the late Justice Rutledge in Marino v. Ragen,8 where he raised the
question of whether there was any remedy whatsoever in Illinois to raise
issues such as denial of counsel.4 The procedural confusion in review of
constitutional issues reached a new height when the Supreme Court in
the Loftus case withheld decision until it could be advised by the Illinois Court what was the nature of the various Illinois methods of review
and which one was proper to test allegedly void convictions. 5 In the subsequent opinion in the same case, People v. Loftus,6 the Illinois Supreme
Court set out what it considered the scope of the Illinois remedies: writ
of error, 7 statutory coram nobis,8 and habeas corpus.9
The Loftus opinion indicated that the writ of error is limited to testing
the record made in the case by the trial court, which consists only of the
indictment, arraignment, plea, trial and judgment. Since the writ of
error does not contain a bill of exceptions unless this is submitted by the
accused and certified by the trial court, 10 where the constitutional deprivation complained of, such as failure to appoint counsel, does not appear
v
in the common law record, appeal by writ of error is impossible."
Although a prisoner under confinement may seek review of his conviction by application for a writ of habeas corpus, the primary function of
this writ is to review alleged lack of power of the court to enter the
order questioned, and lack of jurisdiction over the defendant or over the
subject matter. 12 Another factor which makes review by habeas corpus
8 332 U.S. 561, 564 (1947); also see "Open Letter to the Attorney General of
Ilinois" by Dean Wilbur G. Katz, 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 251 (1948).
4With regard to the constitutional right to counsel, see Comment (1948) 39 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 342.
5 This was due to conflicting statements by the Attorney General of Illinois and
holdings by the Illinois court as to the use of habeas corpus for reviewing an alleged
denial of constitutional right. People ex rel. Thompson v. Neirstheimer, 395 Ill. 572,
71 N.E. (2d) 343.(1947) held it was not the proper remedy. However before the
Supreme Court in Loftus v. Illinois, 334 U.S. 804 (1948) the Attorney General
argued, on the basis of dicta in People v. Shoffner, 400 Ill. 337, 79. N.E. (2d) 200
(1948) and People v. Wilson, 399 Ill. 437, 78 N.E. (2d) 512 (1948), that habeas
corpus was the proper remedy. This was contrary to his argument in White v.
Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945), but consistent with his claims in Marino v. Ragen, 332
U.S. 561 (1947). In its second opinion in People v. Loftus, 400 Ill.432, 81 N.E.
(2d) 495 (1948) the Illinois court held that habeas corpus was the proper means
of testing an allegedly void conviction.
6400 Ill.
432, 81 N.E. (2d) 495 (1948).
7 ll. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38, §§769-7801h.
8Ill. Rev. Stat." (1949) e. 110 §196.
9111. Rev. Stat. (1949) e. 65, §§1-36.
10 Illinois Supreme Court Rules of Practice and Procedure, Rules 36 and 70A,
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 110, §§259.36, 259.70A. People v. Shoffner, 400 Ill. 337, 79
N.E. (2d) 200 (1948); People v. Berry, 399 "il. 17, 76 N.E. (2d) 433 (1947);
People v. Bolds, 398 flL 626, 76 N.E. (2d) 456 (1947); People v. Nelson, 398 I11.
623, 76 N.E. (2d) 441 (1947).

11 Since the common law record imports verity, in the absence of any proof to
the contrary by another matter of record, it is presumed that the court fully discharged all of its duties toward the defendant. People v. Shoffner, 400 Ill.337, 79
N.E. (2d) 200 (1948); People v. Owens, 397 Ill.166, 73 NLE. (2d)'274 (1947);
People v. Puhs, 390 II. 67, 60 N.E. (2d) 205 (1946) ; People v. Pacora, 358 fI1. 448,
193 N.E. 477 (1935). Thus, as frequently is the case, when the record contains no
indication of the alleged deprivation of constitutional right, writ of error is not the
appropriate remedy.
12 People ex rel. Thompson v. Neirstheimer, 395 Ill.
572, 71 N.E. (2d) 343 (1947);
People ex rel. Barrett v. Bradley, 381 Ill. 169,.62 N.E. (2d) 788 (1945); People
ex rel. Courtney v. Sullivan, 363 III. 34, 1 N.E. (2d) 306 (1936). It also has been
held to include anything which happened subsequently to render the judgment void.
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unsatisfactory is the fact that an order denying or quashing the writ
is never res judicata. Therefore, since a judgment denying the prisoner
his freedom is not final, the Illinois Supreme Court cannot review a trial
court's decision. 13 On the other hand, of course, when a writ of habeas
corpus is denied in the Illinois courts, the petitioner can apply for certiorari from14 the United States Supreme Court if a federal question
is involved.
The writ of error coram nobis is the statutory form of the former
common law process by which a court could correct errors of fact occurring in the trial court, which facts, if known to the court, would have
resulted in a different judgment. For example, the fact that the trial
judge would be assumed to know whether the accused had been deprived
of his right to counsel would preclude the use of the statutory coram
nobis as a remedy in such a case. Likewise, a failure to inform an
accused who submits a plea of guilty, that the penalty for the crime
of accessory to murder carries the same penalty as the crime of murder
for which coram nobis would
has also been held to be an error of law
15
not lie as the proper means of review.
In addition to these various limitations, two additional factors have
made review of alleged deprivations of constitutional rights extremely
difficult. First is the virtual impossibility of obtaining a writ of habeas
corpus from the Federal courts due to the exhaustion of remedies rule,
which cannot be satisfied without numerous appeals in state courts that.
are subject to dismissal on procedural grounds. Although the Supreme
Court in Wade v. Mayo16 held that exhaustion of only one state remedy
17
was necessary to obtain Federal habeas corpus, the new Judicial Code,
rejecting Wade v. Mayo, enacted only the complete exhaustion of remedies rule as announced in Ex Parte Hawk.'5 The second problem has
been presented by the inconsistencies of the court holdings and state
claims as to the proper remedies to be pursued. As a result an Illinois
prisoner would have had to make from seven to twelve attempts to seek
People ex rel. Courtney v. Thompson, 358 Ill.81, 192 N.E. 696 (1934); People ex
rel. Hoyne v. Windes, 283 Ill. 251, 119 N.E. 297 (1918).
28, 119 N.E. 940 (1918); People
13 People ex rel. Maglori v. Simmons, 284 Ill.
ex rel. Magee v. McNally, 221 fll. 66, 77 N.E. 544 (1906).
14 Since no higher Illinois court can review the denial of the writ, such a decision
is by the highest court in the state in which a decision can be had and thus is reviewable by the United States Supreme Court, Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561 (1947).
15 People v. Sprague, 371 Ill.627, 21 N.E. (2d) 763 (1939). For a discussion
of writ of error coram nobis and habeas corpus as methods of collateral relief
from convictions in violation of due process in Illinois, see Comment (1947) 38 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 139; reprinted as Comment (1947) 42 Ill. L. Rev. 329; Note
(1947) 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 107, 119, 123.
16 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
17 Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. (June 25, 1948) §2254 which provides
that "An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody
pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears
that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or
that there is either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence
of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the
prisoner.
"An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in
the courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he has the right under
the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented."
Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235 (1949).
18 321 U.S. 114 (1943).
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review in wending his way through the procedural maze before arriving
in Federal court. 19
It was important that a new remedy inquiring into alleged constitutional deprivations at the trial have none of the limitations previously
discussed. An effort was made, therefore, to comply with the statement
of the United States Supreme Court in Carterv. illinois20 that "A State
must give one who is deprived of his freedom the opportunity to open an
inquiry into the intrinsic fairness of a criminal process even though
it appears proper on the surface" and to that end it is essential that
"questions of fundamental justice protected by the Due Process Clause
may be raised, to use the lawyers' language, de hors the record." 2' 1 By
providing a speedy and certain remedy in the state courts the present
Illinois procedure is designed to obviate the necessity of resorting to the
Federal courts for an adjudication of alleged denials of Federal constitutional rights. In the last three terms of the United States Supreme
Court 49% of the pauper cases seeking post-conviction relief originated
in the Illinois prisons, 22 and in the 1946
term the Illinois cases amounted
28
to over 60% of those in this category.
The 1949 Illinois post-conviction remedy act neither supercedes the
existing methods of review nor is it affected by the availability or
unavailability of them. It provides an additional means of obtaining
review, but is limited to the assertion of a substantial denial of federal
or state constitutional rights in the proceedings which resulted in the
petitioner's conviction. There is some question as to the advisability of
providing this new remedy without in some way limiting its use so as to
make it the exclusive means of asserting such a denial or deprivation.
For instance, if,'after a utilization of the various former remedies, this
new procedure still remains available, additional confusion and overload of judicial facilities will have resulted without achieving any worthwhile improvement -in criminal review procedure. On the other .hand,
since the new remedy does not have the technical limitations of writ of
error, statutory coram nobis, or habeas corpus, it could very well be
made the exclusive means of testing allegations of deprivation of constitutional rights.
The New Post-Conviction Heating Law
The scope of the act is set forth in Section 1 which permits the filing
of a petition for a hearing by any person imprisoned in the penitentiary
who asserts that in the prosecution which resulted in his conviction there
was a substantial denial of his rights under the Constitution of the
United States or of the State of Illinois or both.24 Since venue of the
19 Note (1947) 15 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 107, 120.

20 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
21 Id.at 175.

22 Address by Honorable Fred M. Vinson, Chief Justice of the United States,
before the American Bar Association, Sept. 7, 1949, St. Louis, Mo.
23 Justiee Rutledge concurring in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563 (1947).
24 By virtue of the provisions of §1 of the Illinois State Penitentiary Act of 1933,
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 108, §105, specifically incorporating the institutions at
Joliet, hester, and Pontiac into the Illinois Pentitentiary System, any person
imprisoned therein would come within the scope of the new statute. However, People
957 (1938), reversed on other grounds
v. Sowrd, 295 II. App. 314, 14 N.E. (2d)
1933 Act did not make the
370 Il 140, 18 N.. (2d) 176 (1938), held that the
State Reformatory for Women at Dwight a penitentiary.
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proceeding is fixed as the court in which the original trial took place,
some criticism has been voiced as to the advisability of having as the
court hearing the petition the same one in which the alleged deprivation
occurred. However, the same factor is present as regards a hearing of
a motion for a new trial, where the judge is nevertheless considered to
be sufficiently impartial to render an unbiased decision. One explanation for this provision is the desire and practical need to avoid the possibility of having the few trial courts sitting in the counties where the
penitentiaries are located flooded with hearings on petitions under the
new law. The opportunity for review by the state supreme court insures
that the venue provision will not result in prejudice to the petitioner
even though he is seeking to have the trial court review its own alleged
error.
When one of the first petitions25 was filed under the new act, the
Chief Justice of the Criminal Court of Cook County ruled it unconstitutional as "an encroachment on the power of the Judiciary," citing
People ex rel. Stead v. Superior Court,2 6 which held that "when a judgment is affirmed by the Supreme Court, all questions raised by the
assignments of error, and all questions that might have been so raised.
are to be regarded as free from all error, and a final determination"
and that "interference by Nisi Prius judges with execution of such
judgment constitutes a wrongful infringement of the Appellate jurisdiction of said Court." Since the remedy in the new post-conviction
hearing law is similar to statutory coram nobis under Section 72 of theCivil Practice Act, 27 which has been held to permit a trial court to set
aside a conviction and grant a new trial after affirmance of the conviction
on appeal, this ruling of the criminal court of Cook County seems
untenable. Coram nobis, which is available in criminal as well as civil
cases,28 is not considered subject to the rule laid down in the Stead case
because, as the Illinois Supreme Court said in People v. Dabbs, "the
original finding of the court is not disputed or contested, but the bill
proceeds on the theory that newly discovered facts would produce a
different result.''29 The new Illinois post-conviction act has as its purpose the providing of an adequate remedy for adjudicating alleged
deprivations of constitutional rights in criminal trials, and in such cases,
many of which allege lack of counsel and other defects, not of record,
the petitioner should not be foreclosed from a full and proper hearing
on these issues, notwithstanding a prior appeal to the state supreme
court from the conviction.
25 People v. Dale (Criminal Court of Cook County 1949). In this ease, Judge
186, 84 N.E. 875, 877
Lynch merely quoted from People v. Superior Court, 234 Ill.
(1908) the language .used in the text of this article, at note 25, infra, and held that
this was an unconstitutional invasion of the judicial power under Ill. Const. Art. VI,
§2. The argument made by the state's attorney was to the effect that this invaded
the appellate power of the Illinois Supreme Court since it would force a nisi prius
court to accept jurisdiction of a case which had already been reviewed by the higher
tribunal. It is interesting to note that the question was not properly before Judge
Lynch since the Dale ease had not been appealed. At present this ruling is on appeal
to the Illinois Supreme Court, Docket No. 31411.
26 234 Ill.
186, 84 N.E. 875, 877 (1908).
27 111.
Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 110, §196.
28 Thompson v. People, 398 fll. 366, 75 N.E. (2d) 767 (1947); People v. Touhy,
397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E. (2d) 827 (1947); People v. Crooks, 326 Ill. 266, 157 N.E. 218

(1927).

29 372 Ill. 160,-23 N.E. (2d) 343 (1939).
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The ruling holding the new act unconstitutional is also subject to
question in view of the fact that the particular case which was before
the court had not been appealed to the State Supreme Court and therefore no question was presented as to the propriety of a trial court
reviewing a decision of an appellate court. However, even ifthis objection to the new law should be upheld in an appropriate case, there is
no sound basis for invalidating the entire act. It should be entirely
proper for the trial court to have jurisdiction of a petition filed under
the act for a collateral attack on a conviction alleging substantial denial
of constitutional rights. This procedure again may be analogized to the
motion for new trial which is provided for in the fllinois Criminal
Code, 30 but which requires that exceptions be taken in the original trial
in order to qualify for the new trial motion.
In addition to the fiing of the post-conviction hearing petition with
the clerk of the court a copy also is to be served upon the state's attorney by any of the methods of serving papers which are provided in
Rule 7 of the Illinois Supreme Court.31
A five year limitation period is provided for filing the petition, which
is comparable to the period provided for in statutory coram nobis. 32 The
"five years after rendition of final judgment" 33 language was chosen
for this limitation period in order to take advantage of the certainty as
to the point of commencement of the running of the period, and the
84
availability of a body of decided cases which interprets that language
and thus should avoid or at least reduce the litigation necessary to interpret the provision. The same is true with regard to the extension of time
if "the petitioner alleges facts showing that the delay was not due to
his culpable negligence,' 31 which provision is taken from Section 76 of
the Civil Practice Act.8 6 A three year limitation period as to judgments
rendered prior to the enactment of the statute was regarded by the
draftsmen as sufficient time for persons already imprisoned .at the time
of passage of the act, especially in view of the time extension which may
be granted in so-called hardship eases.
Section 2 of the new act prescribes the contents of the petition with
an attempt to reduce to a minimum requirements which may result in
purely technical objections. This is desirable in view of the finality of
the judgment rendered upon the petition. As an aid to petitioners acting without counsel and in an effort to reduce the burden of analyzing
the petitions, no argument, citations or discussion of authorities are to
be included. The basic requirements are the identification of the proceeding which resulted in the conviction, the date of rendition of the
final judgment complained of, and a setting forth of the respects in
30 111. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38, §747 which is governed by the provision for new
trial in civil cases, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 110, §192, but which requires that exceptions be taken at the original trial in order to qualify for the new trial motion.
31 Il.Rev. Stat (1949) c. 110, §259.7.
82111. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 110, §196.
3 Section I of the new act, In. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38, §826.
34 The statutory coram nobis limitation, that filing must be within five years of
rendition of final judgment, has been held to apply to review of criminal as well as
civil proceedings. People v. Touhy, 397 IlL 19, 72 N.E. (2d) 827 (1947); People v.
Rave, 392 Ill. 435, 65 NE. (2d) 23 (1946); People v. Sprague, 371 Ill. 627, 21
N.E. (2d) 763 (1939).
35 Section 1 of the new act, Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) e. 38, §826.
36 ll. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 110, §200 (limitation period for perfecting civil
appeal); Roy v. City of Springfield, 282 Ill. App. 238 (1935).
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which the petitioner's constitutional rights were violated. In addition,
the petition should identify any previous proceedings that may have
been taken to secure relief from the conviction.
The provision requiring the attaching of affidavits, records, or other
evidence supporting the allegations, or a statement explaining why they
are not attached, serves both to incorporate the substance of the existing
requirements as to statutory coram
nobis and to discourage indiscrimi37
nate and unfounded petitions.
Section 3 is of particular importance from the standpoint of the prisoner filing the petition. It provides that "any claim of substantial denial
of constitutional rights not raised in the original or amended petition
is waived." 38 On the basis of Illinois cases which have reached the
United States Supreme Court, this section is within the constitutional
power of the legislature. As that Court held in Parker v. l1linois,39
reaffirming a similar holding in Central Union Co. v. Edwardsvifle,40
constitutional question which Illinois courts have held to be waived for
failure to follow the Illinois procedure will not be heard in the Supreme
Court. This would apply only to claims of denial of rights guaranteed
by the Illinois Constitution, since the issue as to whether Federal rights
have been waived by failure to follow state procedure can be determined
only by the United States Supreme Court.41 Even in cases of alleged
deprivation of Federal rights the issue is whether the state practice gives
the complaining party "a reasonable opportunity to have the issue as to
the claimed right heard and determined" 42 by the state court. Both the
Edwardsville and Parker eases involved litigants who had appealed to
the Illinois Appellate Court when the Illinois practice requires that
constitutional issues be appealed directly to the Illinois Supreme Court,43
and a prior attempt to have them reviewed by the Appellate Court precludes subsequent review of these questions by the state supreme court.
This practice was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in both
cases. The waiver provision of the new law is not subject to what Justiee Rutledge termed a "hypertechnical procedural nullification of constitutional rights.""
Since the purpose of the new act is to provide a quick and adequate
review of alleged denials of constitutionally guaranteed rights, it is
essential that once the petitioner has resorted to its remedy he should not
be free to renew his claims in the future. The Illinois Supreme Court
has upheld the operation of res judicata in criminal as well as civil
37With regard to statutory coram nobis "the issue of fact may be made, and
is generally made, by. affidavits in support of the motion and by counter affidavits
denying the facts set up in the motion and affidavits in support thereof, in which
case the burden of proof is upon the party making the motion to prove his facts
alleged by a preponderance of the evidence." This is true even when applied to
the review of a criminal judgment, as with regard to review of criminal cases the
proceeding is civil in nature. Thompson v. People, 398 Ill. 366, 75 N.E. (2d) 767
(1947); People v. Touhy, 397 Ill. 19, 72 N.E. (2d) 827 (1947); People v. Crooks,
326 Ill. 266, 157 N.E. 218 (1927).
38 11. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 38, §828.
39 333 U.S. 571 (1948).
40 269 U.S. 190 (1925).
41 Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948); Central Union Co. v. Edwardsville,
269 U.S. 190 (1925); Davis v. O'Hara, 266 U.S. 314 (1924).
42 Central Union Co. v. Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 194-195 (1925).
43 111. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 110, §199.
44 Parker v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 571 (1948) dissenting opinion, 578-579, referring
to his concurring opinion in Marino v. Ragen, 332 U.S. 561, 563 (1947).
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cases and given it full effect by precluding the raising of all issues which
might have been raised as well as those which were raised, once an appeal
has been taken and the judgment below affirmed by the Supreme Court. 45
Under the provisions of Section 4, if the petition alleges that the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the court may order
that he be permitted to proceed as a poor person. The provisions for
advising the petitioner of his right to counsel and appointing counsel
for him if the court is satisfied that he has no means of procuring counsel himself, are substantially
the provisions of Rule 27A of the Illinois
6
Supreme Court.
Section 5 provides that the state shall file an answer or motion to dismiss the petition within thirty days after the fling and docketing of the
petition. This requirement that the state set forth grounds of objection
or defense was thought necessary to make a record to which the full
force and effect of the principle of res judicata could be applied. The
provision that no further pleadings shall be filed, except as the court
may order on its own motion or on that of either of the parties, is modeled after the similar
provision in Rule 7(a) of the Federal Rules~ of47
Civil Procedure.
An important feature of Section 5 is the provision for discretionary
withdrawal of the petition at any stage of the proceedings prior to the
entry of judgment. Again the need for this provision results from the
res judicata effect of a judgment under the. act. Since in many cases
the petitioners will be unrepresented by counsel in the first instance, it
is necessary to give laymen, unskilled in the law, some protection against
the absolute finality of the doctrine, the effect of which is difficult for
them to comprehend. The discretionary feature permitting pleading
over, amendment of pleadings, and extensions of time to file pleadings
are similar to Rule 8 of9 the Illinois Supreme Court 48 and Section 46 of
the Civil Practice Act."
Section 6 is concerned with the type of hearing which is to be granted.
The court may receive proof by affidavits, depositions, oral testimony,
or other evidence. It is discretionary with the court as to whether the
prisoner is to be brought before it for the hearing. This provision, plus
the one covering the forms of proof which may be made, was thought
necessary in order to prevent prisoners from obtaining a- free trip from
the penitentiary to the locale of their trial, merely by verifying a petition which is good on its face. Although it could be argued that the
petitioner was entitled to a jury trial at the hearing, since it is regarded
as a new suit, the procedural analogy to habeas corpus would seem to
be a sufficient basis for denying this contention.
A finding in favor of the petitioner does not necessarily result in his
discharge from custody as it merely entitles him to another arraignment
and a retrial. Practically, however, such a finding would often result
in a release from confinement due to the difficulty of re-creating the
state's case some years after it had been prepared.
45 People v. Thompson, 392 II1. 589, 65 N.E. (2d) 362 (1946); People ex rel.
Kerner v. Circuit Court, 369 Il1. 438, 17 NE. (2d) 46 (1938); People ex rel. Stead
v. Superior Court, 234 Ill. 186, 84 N.E. 875 (1908).
46 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 110, §259.27A; with regard to right of counsel and
Rule 27A, a86 Comment (1948) 39 T. Crim. L. & Criminology 342.
47 28 USCA following §723e (1941).

48 111. Rev. Stat. (1949) c. 110, §259.8.
49111. Rev. Stat. (1949)

c. 110, §170.
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In accordance with the underlying purpose of making the proceedings
under this act final, Section 7 provides that any final judgment entered
on a petition filed under it may be reviewed by the Illinois Supreme
Court on writ of error within six months from the entry of the judgment. The writ of error provision is in compliance with numerous Illinois decisions holding that where property rights or personal liberty is
involved, independent of statutory or constitutional provisions the writ
of error lies from the Supreme Court by force of the common law.50
This is particularly true of proceedings which are purely statutory and
unknown to the common law and where the statute does not expressly
forbid the writ of error.5 1
Gonclusion
The new act should be evaluated in terms of the faults in the former
procedures. The goal of the committee which originally drafted the act
as a rule of court, to be promulgated by the Illinois Supreme Court,
was to afford an adequate state procedure for hearing claims of denial
of federal and state constitutional rights. It was felt necessary to provide a speedy, comprehensive and certain state remedy for such abuses,
to clear away the confusion which had arisen regarding the propriety
of the various Illinois procedures.
The post-conviction hearing gives the petitioner adequate opportunity
to present his claims without regard to what is contained in the record,
so long as these claims can be substantiated. The speed with which
review of the individual case may be had depends upon the speed with
which the petition is filed. Procedural simplicity has been achieved by
requiring only such information as is listed in the act and the affidavits,
records or other evidence necessary to support the allegations of the
petition. Sections 3 and 7 combine to give the new remedy the necessary
finality in order to obtain appellate review by the Illinois Supreme
Court, and the United States Supreme Court in appropriate cases.
Although the new law is a commendable one in many respects, since
the remedy it provides does not depend upon the availability of the
already existing methods of review, it would seem that a new procedure
has been added to the already too numerous means of review and, from
the standpoint of the volume of judicial business in this field, this is a
greater detriment than benefit. The satisfactory operation of this new
procedure, if it is to dispense with the technical difficulties of obtaining
a final determination of the issues raised by the prisoner, depends upon
its being the exclusive remedy for raising the claim of deprivation of
constitutional rights. From the standpoint of law enforcement officials,
unless provision is made for such finality, this is just another procedure
available to prisoners desiring to present unfounded claims. The persons for whose benefit this new legislation was passed-prisoners who
have been substantially denied rights guaranteed to them by the Federal
and State constitutions--would not be harmed by an exclusive remedy
provision, as the desired final adjudication of their claims may be had
in a more expeditious manner. In the interests of judicial efficiency, the
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